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Abstract 
 
Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studies 
show that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives. 
We  propose  that  satisfaction  from  choice  is  an  inverted  U-shaped  function  of  the 
number of alternatives.  This proposition is derived theoretically by considering the 
benefits  and  costs  of  different  numbers  of  alternatives  and  is  supported  by  four 
experimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processing 
and  demonstrate  how  this  affects  the  resulting  “satisfaction  function.”  We  further 
indicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people are 
made aware of the existence of other choice sets.  The role of individual differences in 
satisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture.  We 
conclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how much 
choice is “enough.” 
  
Keywords:    Consumer  choice;  perception  of  variety;  tyranny  of  choice;  visual 
perception; cultural differences. 
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Recent research has drawn attention to the fact that, in today’s world, people often 
face an embarrassment of riches in the form of the numbers of alternatives available for 
decisions involving both small and large stakes, e.g., from chocolates and yogurts to 
health plans and pension schemes.  And yet, although both economic theory and the 
psychological literature emphasize that people are better off with more choice (see, e.g., 
Langer & Rodin, 1976; Zuckerman et al., 1978; Ryan & Deci, 2000), having many 
alternatives can be dysfunctional (Schwartz, 2000; 2004; Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 
2006).  Rather than choosing from many alternatives, people sometimes forego or delay 
decisions even though this can be costly (Iyengar, Huberman, & Jiang, 2004). At the 
same  time,  some  studies  report  greater  satisfaction  when  choice  involves  limited 
numbers of alternatives (say six as opposed to thirty, Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
This paper explores how satisfaction from choice varies as a function of set size 
(i.e., the number of alternatives faced).  In doing so, we first note that, at an empirical 
level, the set sizes examined in previous studies favoring choice are typically limited 
(up to 6 options) while the sets claimed to be demotivating are typically large (24-30 
options) (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Kahn & Wansink, 2004). Curiously, little attention 
has been paid to choices involving intermediate numbers of alternatives (between 10 
and 20 options, for example). Second, at a theoretical level we note that authors of these 
empirical studies have not provided an explicit underlying rationale for the phenomena. 
There  seems,  however, to  be  an  implicit argument  that  the  perceived  “benefits”  of 
choice outweigh the “costs” when set sizes are small, but that the reverse obtains for 
large set sizes.  
The goal of this paper is to provide and test an explicit theoretical rationale for 
how satisfaction from choice varies as a function of set size. We emphasize that such an 
explanation should not just predict that more (less) choice is preferred when set size is   4 
small (large) but also what happens at intermediate levels. It should also indicate how 
characteristics of choice alternatives as well as people can affect the relation between 
satisfaction  and  set  size.  In  addition  to  intrinsic  theoretical  interest,  we  stress  that 
developing  an  explicit  account  of  the  relation  between  satisfaction  and  set  size  is 
important  from  a  practical  perspective.  From  the  viewpoint  of  public  policy,  for 
example, it is important to understand how this tradeoff affects people’s choices when 
they are confronted with important decisions such as pension schemes and health plans 
(cf., Botti & Iyengar, in press).   
More specifically, we build on the idea that perceived benefits and costs (defined 
below)  impact  satisfaction  with  choice  –  positively  and  negatively,  respectively. 
Moreover both benefits and costs increase with the number of alternatives.  However, 
we assume that the latter increase faster than the former (e.g., the benefits increase at a 
decreasing rate whereas the costs increase at an increasing rate). This assumption – that 
“goods satiate” while “bads escalate” (Coombs & Avrunin, 1977) – is not trivial and 
leads to predicting that satisfaction, which is defined as net benefits (i.e., benefits less 
costs), is an inverted U-shaped function of set size as illustrated in Figure 1.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Two clear implications of this function are that, first, greater satisfaction will be 
experienced from choices made from intermediate as opposed to large or small set sizes; 
and second, changes in perceived costs and benefits will shift the position of the peak of 
the satisfaction function. For example, holding benefits constant, lower costs will shift 
the peak to the right whereas greater costs will shift it to the left. We test these two 
implications in a series of four experiments in which participants were asked to choose 
between gift boxes presented in different set sizes. We emphasize the explicit nature of   5 
our  theoretical  rationale  and,  in  particular,  the  predicted  shape  of  the  satisfaction 
function.  Our  model  implies  much  more  than  the  extant  empirical  observations  of 
greater satisfaction with more alternatives in “small” sets and less alternatives in “large” 
sets. More critically, it can be falsified empirically. In addition, our model contributes to 
the psychological literature on inverted U-shaped phenomena (Miller, 1956; Berlyne, 
1971) by focusing on tasks involving choice rather than perception or the elicitation of 
the “pleasantness” of stimuli. This is important because choice and perception are not 
tasks that can be considered as equivalent (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. S257).  
Critical to our analysis are the definitions of perceived costs and benefits. We 
consider these to have two components that can be thought of as situational, on the one 
hand, and psychological, on the other. By situational we mean considerations of utility 
as well as the cost of time needed to make a decision. For example, what value does the 
decision maker attribute to having more alternatives? How important is the decision? 
And  so  on.  By  psychological  we  refer  to  both  cognitive  and  psychic  costs.  In  our 
experimental work, we explicitly manipulate cognitive costs of information processing 
by varying the visual attributes of choice alternatives and demonstrate how this affects 
the  shape  of  the  satisfaction  function.  Coincidentally,  our  experimental  participants 
differed on two important personal dimensions, gender and culture. Moreover, whereas 
the general shapes of the satisfaction functions for all groups were consistent with our 
theoretical rationale, differences between groups suggested differences in perceptions of 
costs and benefits by gender and culture.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section elaborates on the theoretical 
framework for the experimental studies. This is followed by the presentation of four 
experiments. Experiment 1 explores the shape of the satisfaction function and examines 
the effect of costs due to visual characteristics of choices. Experiment 2 is a replication   6 
of  Experiment  1  in  two  Eastern  European  countries.  Experiments  3  and  4  further 
investigate the effects of varying cognitive and psychic costs respectively. We conclude 
by discussing implications. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The proliferation of choice alternatives can be thought of as implying benefits and 
costs at two levels. One is at the level of the collective or society, the other at that of the 
individual. For the former, the existence of many alternatives is clearly advantageous in 
that it enables satisfying a multiplicity of different individual preferences. In addition, 
many choices can lead to the benefits of competition, e.g., lower prices and greater 
quality (Loewenstein, 1999). Moreover, the mere fact of having choice alternatives can 
enhance psychological well-being and thus also social welfare (cf., Langer & Rodin, 
1976). 
At  the  individual  level,  however,  the  perceived  benefits  and  costs  of  choice 
depend on both situational and psychological factors. One way of conceptualizing how 
these affect satisfaction is to specify how their associated benefits and costs vary as the 
number of alternatives in the choice set increases. This is illustrated in Table 1 where 
we,  first,  decompose  situational  and  psychological  costs,  and,  second,  indicate  how 
associated costs and benefits increase with set size. Whereas, these costs and benefits 
may interact in different ways, we simplify the discussion here by concentrating on 
“main effects.” 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
We decompose situational factors into two components: time and economic. For 
the  individual,  we  simply  assume  that,  ceteris  paribus,  the  cost  of  time  to  make  a   7 
decision  increases  linearly  with  the  number  of  alternatives  examined.  As  to  the 
economic factor – or more broadly the economist’s notion of utility – we take it that 
benefits increase with the number of alternatives but at a decreasing rate. 
At the psychological level, the cognitive costs of processing alternatives increase 
with the number of alternatives but at an increasing rate. Indeed, there is evidence that 
as the number of alternatives in a choice set increases, people deal with the increasing 
“cognitive strain” by shifting to less comprehensive information processing strategies 
(cf., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
At the psychic level, we postulate both benefits and costs.  By the former we mean 
the  positive  affect  that is  generated  by  having  more  choice.  In  general,  there  is  an 
attraction  to  having  more  alternatives  (cf.,  Iyengar  &  Lepper,  2000.  As  a  thought 
experiment, contrast the emotional feelings experienced when entering a grocery store 
offering only a few options  as opposed to entering a well-stocked competitor.) 
 By 
psychic costs we mean psychological costs that are emotional as opposed to cognitive in 
nature.  These  could  be  caused  by  discomfort  due  to  uncertainty  concerning  one’s 
preferences, lack of expertise, concern or regret about making an incorrect decision, 
emotional costs of making trade-offs, and so on (cf., Loewenstein, 1999). As indicated 
in Table 1, although both psychic benefits and costs are assumed to increase with the 
number  of  alternatives,  the  former  do  so  at  a  decreasing  rate  and  the  latter  at  an 
increasing rate. 
Summing  the  situational  and  psychological  benefits  and  costs  of  choice,  our 
assumptions imply that, whereas both increase with the number of alternatives, benefits 
do so at a decreasing rate but costs at an increasing rate. Thus, equating satisfaction with 
the net difference between benefits and costs, we predict that satisfaction is an inverted-  8 
U shaped function of the number of alternatives
1. This is precisely the type of situation 
described by Coombs and Avrunin (1977), i.e., when “goods satiate but bads escalate.”  
The framework implicit in Table 1 also suggests how individual differences will 
affect  the  relation  between  satisfaction  and  set  size.  For  example,  holding  other 
variables constant, relative expertise in a given area or  well established preferences 
would be expected to lower psychological costs and thereby shift the maximum of the 
satisfaction  curve  to  the  right.  We  do  not  investigate  the effects  of  such  individual 
differences explicitly in this work but return to discuss the possibility in the General 
Discussion (below). We also emphasize that we limit our analysis and predictions to 
situations  where  people  do  actually  make  choices.  The  issue  of  when  people  avoid 
choice is deferred to the General Discussion.  
As noted above, we have simplified the discussion of the benefits and costs of 
different numbers  of alternatives  by ignoring possible interactions between different 
components. However, we believe that the simple structure implied by Table 1 should 
be investigated prior to considering such factors. This is the purpose of the present 
paper. 
We therefore state our first hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 1:  Satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of the 
number of alternatives in the choice set. 
Effects of different visual presentations. An implication of the model in Table 1 is 
that changes to benefits and costs will change the satisfaction function. That is, it will 
maintain its inverted-U shape but maximum satisfaction will be shifted to the right or 
left, up or down, as appropriate.  
Several studies suggest that the manner in which choice sets are presented can 
affect decisions, especially, when these are large. For example, Miller (1956) noted that   9 
the  organization  of  information  into  “chunks”  or  sequences  facilitates  information 
processing. More recently, Kahn and Wansink (2004) showed how organization affects 
consumers’ perceptions of the variety of an assortment (i.e., perceived variety).
2 For 
large choice sets, perceived variety is higher in organized sets; whereas for smaller sets, 
it is greater in disorganized sets. 
Huffman and Kahn (1998) investigated how to present large choice sets without 
decreasing satisfaction. They demonstrated that, for high-variety sets, consumers were 
more satisfied (in terms of learning their own preferences), perceived less complexity, 
and were more willing to make choices when alternatives were presented in attribute- 
rather than alternative-based formats.  
We suggest that satisfaction is also affected by the visual presentation of choice 
sets  in  that  this  impacts  the  cognitive  costs  of  information  processing.  Noting  the 
implications of limitations in human visual abilities, Filin (1998) argues that people 
experience a feeling of discomfort and dissatisfaction in two “poorly organized” visual 
environments:  “aggressive”  environments  (i.e.,  those  with  a  great  concentration  of 
similar elements) and “homogeneous” environments (i.e., those with monotonic visual 
scenes, like plain white walls). 
In our work, we consider the effect of two visual qualities – color and shape.
3 
We suggest that if a choice set is large and the alternatives differ only in shape, the 
assortment  has a  “monotonic”  look such  that  the consumer faces  a “homogeneous” 
visual  environment  that  imposes  costs  of  discomfort  (i.e.,  cognitive  costs  increase). 
Provision of colors, however, may resolve the problem of monotonicity by making the 
items more distinct thereby reducing costs for the human visual system. 
 
Indeed, Spring and Jennings (1993) claim that hue is recognized pre-attentively, 
while  complex  shape  is  a  non-preattentive  stimulus  that  requires  more  time  to  be   10 
processed. Thus, to the extent that hue is a pre-attentive stimulus, its detection should 
not depend on the size of the set in which it is presented (Spring & Jennings, 1993). On 
the other hand, since shape is a non-preattentive stimulus, the time and effort involved 
in processing shapes should be particularly high in larger sets.  
We  therefore  propose  that,  when  the  set  of  alternatives  is  large,  the  cost  of 
choice is higher for sets with alternatives differing in shape than for those differing in 
color.  As a result, we expect people to be more satisfied when they are presented with 
large sets with options that differ in color as opposed to shape. In other words, the peak 
of the satisfaction function for colors will lie to the right of that for shapes.   
However,  when  the  choice  set  is  small  (i.e.,  within  human  information 
processing  limits),  the  negative  impact  on  the  human  visual  system  should  not  be 
significant and we expect no such difference. More formally, we state:  
Hypothesis 2: Visual presentation of sets affects satisfaction. People experience 
higher satisfaction when the alternatives in large choice sets are different in color but 
not in shape. However, for small choice sets, they are equally satisfied when alternatives 
are presented in either different colors or shapes. 
 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to explore how satisfaction from choice varies as a 
function of the number of alternatives and to examine how changes in cognitive costs 
affect  satisfaction.  In  this  laboratory  experiment,  participants  were  given  a  picture 
representing a set of gift boxes with a certain number of alternatives (5, 10, 15, or 30).   
They were asked to choose one gift box they would buy to pack a present for a friend 
and to report their levels of satisfaction. We manipulated cognitive costs imposed on 
individuals by varying two visual attributes of the gift boxes – color and shape.    11 
 
Method  
Choice sets. Choice sets consisted of 5, 10, 15, or 30 gift boxes. The gift boxes 
differed from each other on two visual attributes: color and/or shape. Three types of 
sets were created representing gift boxes of: (1) the same shape and different colors 
(SSDC sets); (2) the same color and different shapes (SCDS sets); (3) and different 
colors and different shapes (DCDS sets). The gift boxes did not contain anything and, 
except for visual attributes, were said to be identical.  We refer to the SSDC and SCDS 
sets  as  “simple”  since  they  vary  on  only  one  attribute  and  to  the  DCDS  sets  as 
“complex” since alternatives differ on two dimensions. 
Previous research demonstrates that perceived variety is affected by how sets are 
organized  and  by  relative  symmetry  in  the  frequency  of  items  (Kahn  &  Wansink, 
2004). To control for these effects, no choice sets contained identical alternatives and 
all sets were organized (e.g., by shading of colors). 
Participants and procedure. The 120 participants were students and professors at 
several universities in Barcelona (53% females, mean age of 23.7 years). All spoke 
English and received no financial remuneration. 
The participants were randomly divided into 12 experimental groups formed by 
crossing two between-subject factors – number of choice options with four levels (5, 
10, 15 or 30), and three types of choice sets, SSDC, SCDS, and DCDS.  
The  experimenter  invited  one  participant  at  a  time  into  the  experimental 
laboratory and showed him/her a picture representing a set of gift boxes. (Participants 
were unaware of the existence of other choice sets.) Each participant had to examine 
the picture and state which box s/he would buy to pack a present for a friend. After   12 
choosing,  participants  answered  a  paper-based  questionnaire,  evaluating  satisfaction 
from the choice and providing demographic characteristics. 
Dependent  measures.    We  measured  satisfaction  with  the  option  chosen  by 
participants’ answers to the question “How much do you like the gift box you decided 
to pick?” Responses to two further questions were used to measure satisfaction from the 
process of choice itself. These were “How much did you enjoy making the choice (the 
decision process)?” and “Did you find it difficult to make your decision of which gift 
box to purchase?” Responses were provided on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“not at 
all”) to 10 (“extremely”).
  
To evaluate whether participants felt they had been offered too many, too few, or 
the right amount of options, the respondents were also asked: “Do you feel you had the 
right amount of options to choose from?”  Responses were provided on a nine-point 
Likert scale where 1 = “No, I had too few choice options,” 5 = “Yes, I had just the right 




Satisfaction  from  the  choice  function.  The  results  of  Experiment  1  strongly 
support our first hypothesis. Self-reported satisfaction (both with the gift-box and the 
process of choosing) is an inverted U-shaped function of the number of alternatives as 
shown in Figures 2a and 2b. The participants reported lower satisfaction with choice 
from limited (5) and extensive (30) options, and higher satisfaction from medium-sized 
sets  (10  and  15  options).  The  10-option  set  was  found  to  be  the  most  satisfying. 
Difficulty of choosing also increased with the set size, though not significantly (see 
Figure 2c). Participants further believed that the “right number of options” was 10 or 15   13 
(see Figure 2d).
 5 The 30-option set was considered to be overwhelming, while the 5-
item set was perceived as offering too little choice. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In terms of statistical tests, ANOVA (see Table 2) indicates that the size of the 
choice set significantly affects satisfaction for all four dependent measures. Statistical 
tests of the nature of these differences (i.e., whether satisfaction functions have inverted 
U shapes) are presented in Appendix A. This shows, for example, that for “satisfaction 
from the gift box picked” (Figure 2a), the mean satisfaction for 10 options (8.5) is 
significantly  greater  than  both  those  for  5  and  15  options  (i.e.,  7.0  and  7.7, 
respectively), and that satisfaction for 15 options significantly exceeds that for 30 (i.e., 
7.7 vs. 7.1).  
Gender  and  complexity.  ANOVA  revealed  significant  gender  differences  in 
satisfaction from the gift box picked (controlling for the set size).
 Compared to men, 
women reported higher satisfaction from the box they decided to pick (see Appendix 
B).  
ANOVA (see Appendix C) also showed that participants facing simple sets were 
significantly more satisfied both with the gift box picked and with the decision process 
than  those  encountering  complex  choice  sets  (controlling  for  the  set  size).  No 
significant gender or complexity effects were found for the other dependent variables. 
Visual presentation. Experiment 1 also aimed to test whether two visual attributes 
–  color  and  shape  –  which  impose  low  and  high  cognitive  costs  on  an  individual, 
respectively – affect satisfaction from different set sizes. We therefore analyzed the 
responses of the 80 participants who faced SCDS and SSDC sets.    14 
ANOVA supported our second hypothesis. Participants facing large sets (i.e., 30 
options)  with  alternatives  varying  in  color  reported  significantly  higher  satisfaction 
from the box they decided to pick [F(1, 72) = 10.93, p = .002] than those encountering 
the sets with items different in shape (Figure 3a). For the small and medium-sized sets, 
however, this difference was not significant [F(1, 72) = 0.95, p = .334; F(1, 72) = 3.06, 
p = .084; F(1, 72) = 0.95 , p = .334 for 5-, 10- , and 15-option sets respectively]. 
Moreover, the participants facing SSDC sets were significantly more satisfied with the 
process of choosing than those who encountered SCDS sets over the entire range of 
sets sizes [F(1, 75) = 4.15, p = .045] – see Figure 3b. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Visual format also affected participants’ beliefs about the right number of options 
in the set. When facing SSDC sets, the participants believed that 15- or even 30-option 
sets contained “about the right number of options” [F( 1, 72) = 1.65, p = .203; F( 1, 72) 
= 1.65, p = .203 respectively]. However, 30 options in the SCDS sets were viewed as 
“more than the right amount” [F(1, 72) = 26.40, p = .000] – see Figure 3c.  
Our results and analysis demonstrated that satisfaction is an inverted U-shaped 
function of the number of alternatives for the SCDS sets. For the SSDC sets, however, 
this  inverted  U-shape  relation  is  not  evident  as  the  function  did  not  decrease 
significantly after the peak. To verify whether satisfaction would fall if the size of the 
SSDC  set  would  become  “too  large,”  we  conducted  an  additional  treatment  (with 
procedure  identical  to  the  other  treatments)  where  34  new  participants  faced  an 
extensive SSDC set of 54 gift boxes. Results indicated that, from the 30 to 54 option 
set, satisfaction from both the gift box and the decision process did indeed decrease    15 
significantly (from 8.3 to 7.1 [ t = -2.31, p = .024], and from 7.1 to 5.2 [t = -2.52, p = 
.014], respectively – see Figures 3 a and b).  
 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that satisfaction is an inverted U-shaped function of 
the number of options in the set. It is important to note, however, that the peak of the 
function, or the highest satisfaction level, may not be a single point, but a range of 
alternatives. For example, this was the case with the SSDC sets where 10-, 15-, and 30-
option  sets  all  belong  to  “the  optimum”  of  the  function  and  are  seen  as  equally 
satisfying.   
Experiment 1 also provided empirical evidence for the differences in satisfaction 
due  to  the  visual  layout  of  alternatives.  As  expected,  people  experience  higher 
satisfaction when the  alternatives in large choice sets differ in color as opposed  to 
shape, whereas we find no such difference for the small sets. We believe that, due to 
particularities  of  the  human  visual  system  discussed  above,  the  costs  of  choosing 
among alternatives differing in shape are greater than among options varying in color, 
and  especially  when  the  choice  set  is  large  (otherwise  we  would  find  significant 
differences across the entire range of the sets). Therefore, for the former, the peak of 
the resulting satisfaction function is shifted to the left relative to the latter.  
These findings have important practical implications for people offering choices.  
The results suggest that  presenting alternatives of large sets in different  colors can 
create “comfortable” visual environments and thereby positively influence satisfaction 
from choice. As a result, people may be able to obtain high benefits from larger set 
sizes without losing satisfaction.    16 
Experiment 1 suggests that the satisfaction function may depend on gender. For 
males the function lies below of that for females. Why this occurred is unclear. Several 
explanations  come  to  mind.  First, at a cognitive  level,  there  is some  evidence  that 
women are used to paying more attention to detailed information than men and this 
habit might lower the costs of choice in some tasks (cf., Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran 
1991; Meyers-Levy 1998). Second, females may simply care more about items such as 
gift boxes than males and therefore be motivated to expend more effort. Third, gender 
effects  might be  task dependent.   For  a different  kind of  choice (e.g., beer or  cell 
telephones), one might find a reversed effect. Therefore, whether gender effects can be 
generalized across different conditions remains unclear and is an interesting topic for 
further research. 
The  findings  of  Experiment  1  also  demonstrated  that  subjects  reported  lower 
satisfaction from the alternative picked and from the decision-making process when 
encountering complex rather than simple sets over the entire range of set sizes. This 
finding is consistent with our model. As the complexity of the sets increases, both the 
psychological costs and benefits rise. On one hand, it is harder to process and compare 
alternatives varying on two rather than on one attribute. On the other hand, the former 
may create stronger, pleasant feelings of “having a choice” than the latter. If the shift in 
costs  is  greater  than  that  in  benefits,  the  resulting  satisfaction  function  shifts 
downwards. However, because we only observe “net effects” of perceived benefits and 
costs in our experimental paradigm, we were unable to test this implication explicitly. 
The  separation  of  effects  of  costs  and  benefits  is  clearly  critical  for  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  underlying  processes  of  choice  and  should  therefore  be 
investigated in further research.   17 
The results of Experiment 1 also showed that some sub-samples of individuals 
with similar cultural background reported similar satisfaction levels (not presented). 
Whether this was a coincidence or a general trend was impossible to detect due to 
limited  sub-sample  sizes.  However,  recent  studies  suggest  that  choice  may  reflect 
cultural differences.  Iyengar  and Lepper  (1999), for example, demonstrated cultural 
effects on intrinsic motivation: European-Americans are more intrinsically motivated 
by personal choice whereas Asian-Americans may prefer to have choices suggested to 
them by “valued ingroup members.”  We therefore took the opportunity to replicate 
Experiment 1 in an Eastern European sample and to compare results with the data 




The  objective  of  Experiment  2  was  to  replicate  Experiment  1  in  an  Eastern 
European sample and thereby also investigate possible cultural influences. The design 
was identical to that of Experiment 1.
 6  Participants of Experiment 2 were 120 students 
and professors (mean age of 21 years, 53% males) from several universities in two 




Satisfaction  from  choice.  Consistent  with  the  findings  of  Experiment  1  (and 
Hypothesis 1), the satisfaction function of the Eastern European sample had an inverted 
U-shape (see Figure 2, Table 2 and Appendix A). However, participants from Belarus 
and Ukraine reported the highest satisfaction with the gift box picked from 15- and 30-
option sets whereas Western Europeans were most satisfied with the box chosen from   18 
medium-sized sets. The peak of the function, therefore, was shifted toward a greater 
number of alternatives in the Eastern European sample [F(4, 232) = 4.10, p = .003, 
Chow test], sets with 15 options being seen as the most satisfying.
7 Interestingly, the 
participants also reported the lowest difficulty levels when choosing from such sets, and 
considered that the 15-option set included exactly the “right number of boxes.” 
Gender and complexity. We found significant gender and complexity effects for 
several dependent variables in the Eastern European sample (see Appendices B and C). 
Eastern  European females  reported significantly  higher  satisfaction  levels  than  men 
both with the box picked and with the decision process. Across all set sizes, satisfaction 
with the box picked was lower for participants facing complex as opposed to simple 
sets. 
Visual presentation. In line with the findings of Experiment 1 (and Hypothesis 2), 
ANOVA yielded differences in satisfaction of the Eastern European participants due to 
the visual layout of alternatives. Eastern Europeans reported higher satisfaction both 
with the gift box picked [F(1, 72) = 4.02, p = .049], and with the decision process [F(1, 
72) = 3.13, p = .081], when facing large sets (30 options) in the SSDC as opposed to 
SCDS format. Moreover, participants felt they had fewer options when facing SSDC 
sets rather than the same sized SCDS sets [F(1, 75) = 8.26, p = .01] – see Figure 4. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 provided support for Hypothesis 1 in a different cultural sample. 
The inverted U-shaped relation between satisfaction and the number of alternatives was 
replicated  in  Eastern  Europe.  At  the  same  time,  the  results  suggest  that  cultural 
background can affect perceptions of the costs and benefits of choice. Participants from   19 
Eastern Europe were more satisfied with larger choice sets as opposed to their Western 
counterparts, that is, the peak of satisfaction function for former lies to the right of that 




Experiments  1  and  2  demonstrated  that  visual  presentation  of  assortment 
influences  satisfaction.  More  specifically,  participants  reported  significantly  higher 
levels of satisfaction when the alternatives in the large choice sets were different in 
color but not  in shape (Hypothesis 2). However, does this  mean that the sets  with 
alternatives different in color are also more attractive than those that vary in shape?  
This question becomes relevant when people choose between different sets of offerings 
rather than selecting an item from a given set.  
As a corollary to Hypothesis 2, therefore, we suggest that since visual “comfort” 
is more pleasing for the eyes (and less “costly” to process), one should also expect large 
SSDC sets to be more appealing than large SCDS sets. Also – and once again – since 
the costs of choice from small sets are not unduly taxing, we would not expect such 
effects with small sets. More formally, we state:  
Hypothesis 3: Visual properties of the set affect its attractiveness. More people 
are attracted to large sets when alternatives differ in color as opposed to shape. No such 
effects exist for small sets. 




Procedure. The design of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiment 1. The 
main difference was that, first, participants had to decide which of the sets of gift boxes   20 
they liked the most: that in “shop A” which offered gift boxes varying in shape (SCDS 
set) or that in “shop B” which offered boxes differing in color (SSDC set). Participants 
were given pictures representing each of the two sets. The choice sets were identical to 
those of Experiment 1. Both sets offered to a particular individual were of the same size 
involving 5, 10, 15, or 30 alternatives. 
 Participants  were  48  undergraduate  students  (mean  age  of  19.2  years,  54% 
females) at a  Spanish University.  Participants were  not  remunerated. Groups  of  12 
participants were assigned at random to each of four groups evaluating the different-
sized options. 
First, participants had to choose which choice set – shop A or B – they preferred 
and answer a questionnaire assessing their satisfaction with each set and the difficulty 
of choosing between them. Second, the participants were left with the picture of the 
choice set they had selected and asked to choose a gift box and complete the same 
questionnaire as in Experiment 1. 
Measures. First, we simply counted the numbers of participants who chose each 
“shop” for the different set sizes. Second, we assessed participants’ satisfaction with 
each choice set and the difficulty of choosing between them by asking “How much do 
you like the assortment in shop A?”, “How much do you like the assortment in shop  
B?”, and “How difficult was it for you to decide to which shop to go?” Responses were 
provided on a Likert scale ranging from one (“Not at all”) to 10 (“Extremely”). Third, 
satisfaction  measures  concerning  choices  of  boxes  were  identical  to  those  used  in 
Experiment 1.  
 
 
   21 
Results  
When  facing  medium  or  large  choice  sets  (i.e.,  sets  containing  10,  15  or  30 
alternatives) 25 out of 36 participants preferred the options in shop B where boxes 
varied in color but not in shape thereby indicating that the former are more attractive 
[p(x ≤ 11) = .025, binomial test]. For small sets (5 options), there was no significant 
difference [p(x ≤ 5) = .387]. However, this lack of a significant difference could simply 
be due to the small sample of participants (12) facing 5-alternative sets. We therefore 
recruited  19  additional  participants  for  a  5-option  set  treatment  of  this  experiment.  
Results showed that of the 31 participants who faced 5-alternative sets, 15 preferred the 
SSDC sets. In other words, there was no significant difference in choices between the 
SCDS and SSDC sets [p(x ≤ 15) = 0.500, binomial test]. 
Finally,  participants  reported  greater  satisfaction  levels  from  the  SSDC  than 
SCDS sets when the number of alternatives in the set exceeded 10 (t = 1.98, p = .056), 
but similar satisfaction levels for 5-option sets (t = 0.98, p = .381). 
 
Discussion of Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 3 provide support for Hypothesis 3. Sets of alternatives 
differing in color were more attractive than those differing in shape when the sets were 
large,  while  both  were seen  as equally  appealing  when  set  size  was  small.  This is 
consistent  with  the  arguments  provided  above.  Namely,  the  costs  of  processing 
alternatives  differing  in  color  are  lower  for  the  human  visual  system  than  those 
associated with shape. 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants, who had to decide which assortment 
they  preferred  before  picking  the  gift  box,  reported  lower  satisfaction  (though  not 
significantly so) than subjects whose task was to choose a gift box from a given set.   22 
This lack of statistical significance (not reported), however, may be a result of limited 
sub-samples  of  experimental  participants.  We  therefore  took  the  opportunity  to 
investigate this issue further in a slightly different experimental setting. 
In our initial setting, participants face a given set of choice alternatives and are 
unaware of the possible existence of other sets. However, would satisfaction be affected 
if participants were aware of the existence of choice sets different from theirs?  Clearly, 
people do not only engage in evaluating trade-offs between the alternatives they face, 
but  also  compare  their  own  possibilities  with  those  of  others.  Indeed, as  originally 
demonstrated by Festinger (1954), when objective measures are not available, people 
tend to judge their own possibilities by comparison with those of others.  Thus, if when 
presented with a set of alternatives, a person is made aware of the existence of other 
alternatives, he or she may well feel at a disadvantage and thereby incur psychic costs.  
In our model, this would imply a shift of the initial cost curve (i.e., due to the fixed 
psychic costs incurred before even viewing the choice set) with a consequent negative 
impact on satisfaction. More formally, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis  4:    Individuals,  who  are  aware  of  the  existence  of  choice  sets 
different from theirs and from which they cannot choose, are less satisfied with their 
choice than those who do not possess such knowledge. 





Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 2 with two exceptions. First, 
unlike  Experiment  2,  where  only  one  participant  at  a  time  was  invited  into  the 
experimental laboratory, in Experiment 4 several subjects followed the experimental   23 
procedure simultaneously in the same room. Second, participants of Experiment 4 were 
explicitly told that their colleagues had been given choice sets differing from their own 
in size and visual properties of the alternatives. The subjects were unaware how many 
different choice sets there were, which choice set was larger or smaller and could only 
see the sets offered to their colleagues from a distance. After being given a picture 
representing a choice set, participants followed the same procedure as in Experiment 2. 
The choice sets and satisfaction measures were identical to those used in Experiments 1 
and 2. 
Referring to participants in Experiment 4 as an “aware” sample and those in 
Experiment  2  as  an  “unaware”  sample,  a  comparison  of  the  responses  of  the  two 
samples provides a test of Hypothesis 4. 
Participants. These were 120 students and professors (53% females, mean age 
of 24.3 years) from several universities in Belarus (47%) and Ukraine (53%). They 




Consistent with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, satisfaction with the gift 
box picked was found to follow an inverted U-shape for the “aware” sample – see 
Figure  5.  However,  there  were  significant  differences  in  satisfaction  of  subjects  in 
Experiments 2 and 4. Compared to the unaware sample, the aware participants were less 
satisfied with the gift box picked (F(4, 232) = 2.72, p = .030, Chow test; “awareness” 
dummy F(1, 232) = 4.24, p = .041), and with the process of choosing (F(1, 235) = 4.96, 
p = .027), thereby providing support for Hypothesis 4. That is, the satisfaction function 
for aware participants was shifted downwards in comparison with the unaware group. 
Moreover,  participants  of  Experiment  4  felt  they  had  “fewer”  choices  than  their 
counterparts in Experiment 2 (F(1, 232) = 3.58,  p = .060).   24 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Discussion of Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 provided additional support for Hypothesis 1. The inverted U-
shape of the satisfaction function  was  replicated in the “aware”  sample.  Supporting 
Hypothesis  4,  the results of Experiment  4 also  demonstrated  that knowledge of the 
existence  of  choice  sets  different from  one’s  own  decreases  satisfaction.  As argued 
above, the effect of telling participants explicitly that others can choose from different 
sets imposes additional “fixed” psychic costs even before the choice is made. Holding 
benefits constant, this initial increase in psychic costs results in a downward shift of the 
satisfaction function.  
We cannot exclude the possibility that other factors might also have contributed 
to the effect we observed. First, given the importance of feelings of control on intrinsic 
motivation (Taylor & Brown, 1988), the conditions participants faced in Experiment 4 
might have increased psychic costs by emphasizing that participants lacked control over 
the  choice  situation.  Second,  Carmon,  Wertenbroch,  and  Zeelenberg  (2003)  have 
demonstrated that close consideration of options may induce “attachment” to options, 
and  that  people  may  feel  the  “loss”  of  alternatives  not  chosen.  In  our  case,  the 
participants may have not only felt the “loss” of the foregone boxes in their own sets, 
but also of those they did not see.  
In  Experiment  4,  satisfaction  from  the  decision  process  appeared  to  increase 
across the entire range of alternatives. However, this does not mean that the function 
does  not  have  an  inverted  U-shape.  We  suggest  that  after  some  large  number  of 
alternatives (greater than 30), the costs will outweigh the benefits, and the function will 
decline, exactly as occurred with the SSDC satisfaction function in Experiment 1.
9 This   25 
proposition, however, should be tested in a setting where the number of alternatives is far 




This paper has explored the nature of satisfaction from choice as a function of 
characteristics of choice sets. Building upon the theoretical insights of Coombs and 
Avrunin (1977), we suggested that as the number of alternatives increases, so do the 
resulting  benefits  and  costs.  However,  whereas  the  former  “satiate,”  the  latter 
“escalate.” The net effect is that satisfaction is an inverted U-shaped function of set 
size. Our experiments provided support for this proposition. 
At  a  theoretical  level,  our  goal  was  to  make  explicit  the  implications  of 
perceptions  of  costs  and  benefits  of  the  choice  process.  To  test  our  theoretical 
framework,  therefore,  we  manipulated  differences  in  cognitive  costs  by  contrasting 
satisfaction from choice when sets varied in color as opposed to shape. As predicted, in 
a between-subjects design participants viewed larger sets with alternatives differing in 
color as being both more satisfying and attractive than those with alternatives varying 
in shape. That is, the location of the peak of the satisfaction function was influenced by 
visual presentation of the choice set.   
Costs as well as benefits of choice may also depend on individual characteristics. 
In this work, we identified three such variables: awareness of the existence of other 
choice  sets,  gender,  and  culture.    We  interpreted  awareness  of  the  existence  of 
alternatives from which choice can not be made as imposing additional psychic costs 
which, in turn, result in a downward shift of the satisfaction function.  
For the choices examined here, the satisfaction curve for women lay above that 
for men. The peak of the curve for the Eastern-European sample was shifted to the right   26 
of that for Western European sample. As noted earlier, we had no explicit hypotheses 
concerning these findings but suggest that they provided a useful springboard for future 
research. In particular, we suspect that the type of choice made could moderate these 
kinds of individual results. For example, if gender or culture is correlated with expertise 
in types of choice, one could well find that differential knowledge by decision makers 
would appear to reveal itself in the form of effects due to gender or culture. 
Our  investigation  was  guided  by  the  framework  outlined  in  Table  1  and  the 
simple assumption that satisfaction is the net difference between perceived costs and 
benefits.  Given the support of our experimental evidence, we now outline implications 
and suggestions for further research.   
First, in our experimental tasks, participants were required to make a choice. In 
many situations, however, people may decide to avoid or defer making choices (cf., 
Dhar, 1997) and it is also important to predict this phenomenon. One way of thinking 
about this within the framework of Table 1 is to predict that choice is deferred or 
avoided  when  expected  satisfaction  is  negative,  i.e.,  when  perceived  costs  exceed 
benefits.  With this in mind, one can imagine investigations in which variables are 
manipulated to produce these effects.  For example, imagine the effect of imposing time 
limits on an important choice such that cognitive and psychic costs increase rapidly and 
the person decides to defer choice (i.e., satisfaction becomes negative). An advantage 
of our framework is that we can specify the expected effects of different variables in 
this process as well as predict differences due, for example, to severity of the time limit 
or importance of the decision. 
Second,  we  did  not  vary  economic  considerations  in  our  experimental  work. 
However, our framework suggests how these might affect the satisfaction function. On 
the one hand, one would expect a desire to see more alternatives as decisions become   27 
more  important,  i.e.,  the  benefits  of  choice.  At  the  same  time,  however,  important 
choices could induce greater psychic costs as people become more concerned about 
knowing their preferences and the possible regret of making errors (thereby reducing 
the number of alternatives they would like to see). When economic stakes are high, we 
would particularly expect to see expertise have a large effect on the location of the peak 
of the satisfaction function. Thus, for example, in choosing a pension plan, we would 
predict that the ideal number of alternative portfolios for a specialist (e.g., a security 
analyst) would far exceed that of a financial novice.  More generally, we believe much 
could  be  gained  by  linking  our  framework  to  the  literature  on  expertise  (Chase  & 
Simon, 1973). 
Third,  in  our  study,  participants  were  making  choices  for  themselves.  An 
intriguing change to the implied costs might occur if they were making choices on 
behalf of others, i.e., as an agent.  For example, if a financial specialist were selecting a 
portfolio for a friend as opposed to herself, would she be willing to examine more 
alternatives?  To the extent that this would make the person feel more responsible, it 
follows that she probably would (cf., Tetlock, 1991).  
Fourth, the optimal number of alternatives (for satisfaction) in our studies was 
found to be 10 or 15. These numbers are exactly the same as those reported by Miller 
(1956) for the “channel capacity” of visual positioning, that is, the number of visual 
positions the human eye can distinguish without making errors. It is unclear whether 
this  is  a  coincidence.  However,  it  suggests  investigating  whether  satisfaction  is  an 
inverted  U-shaped  function  of  the  number  of  alternatives  when  these  are  not 
characterized visually but by, say, tone, taste, or odor. Building upon our theoretical 
framework, we would still expect satisfaction to be an inverted U-shaped function of 
the  numbers  of  these  stimuli.    Miller  (1956)  argued  that  the  “span  of  absolute   28 
judgment” is greater for visual stimuli than for tones or taste stimuli. Therefore, as the 
costs of processing the latter are higher, we would also expect the location of the peaks 
of the satisfaction functions for these to lie to the left of those for visual stimuli. 
Fifth, in this experimental work we simplified by focusing on simple objects that 
differed on only one or two attributes. Clearly, an important next step will be to extend 
the  approach  adopted  here  to  more  complex  products  in  naturally-occurring  field 
studies. 
Sixth, the measures used in our studies were subjective reports of satisfaction. To 
assess the underlying costs of information processing better, it would be helpful to 
combine these reports with more objective  measures  obtained by, say, eye-tracking 
devices and, possibly, the techniques of neuroscience. 
Seventh, both in the current paper and previous research 30-option sets have been 
considered “large” and five-option sets “small.” What, however, do decision makers 
consider “large,” “small,” or “medium-sized” and how does this vary by types of choice 
situations and individuals? 
In summary, we have presented a simple theoretical rationale that makes explicit 
the  reasons  underlying  the  inverted  U-shaped  function  that  describes  the  relation 
between satisfaction from choice and the number of alternatives in a choice set.  At one 
level, good “common sense” suggests that people will be unsatisfied and confused by 
having  “too  many”  choice  alternatives.  However,  it  is  quite  another  matter  to 
understand  the  point  at  which  there  are  “too  many  alternatives”  and  how  different 
variables contribute to the satisfaction that people experience from choice.  The goal of 
this paper has been to help elucidate this issue.   29 
Footnotes 
 
1 Desmeules (2002) has suggested that, when evaluating alternatives cognitively, the 
consumption experience might have an inverted U-shaped relationship across set size. 
However, his proposition was neither formalized nor tested empirically. 
2 Kahn and Wansink (2004) suggest that actual variety consists of two components: 
first,  “the  number  of  distinct  options  or  the  number  of  conceptually  distinct 
subcategories;” and second, “the number of category replicates.”  
3 Our purpose here is not to determine how visual characteristics of separate objects 
influence  decisions  but  rather  how  the  visual  characteristics  of  the  entire  set  affect 
satisfaction. Individual preferences for colors and forms are not, therefore, a subject of 
the current paper. 
4 Most of the measures used in this experiment were similar to those used by Iyengar 
and Lepper (2000) in their study 3 which motivated the current research. 
5 Recall that on this scale five was “ideal” with one being “too few” and nine “too 
many.” 
6 The studies in Eastern Europe were, however, conducted in Russian. 
7 The overall means of satisfaction with the gift box were not different for the two 
samples (t = 0.084, p = .933). 
8 Given the comparative paucity of choice in Eastern Europe until fairly recently, one 
might have imagined the contrary result, that is, Eastern Europeans would have been 
more satisfied with fewer alternatives.   
9 Recall that in Experiment 1 the satisfaction function decreased significantly when the 
size of SSDC sets was increased to 54 alternatives.   30 
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Table 2 
Significance of the set size effect on dependent variables 
   
Statistics   




Satisfaction from the 
gift box picked 
F(3, 116) = 8.92 
p = .000 
F(3, 116)= 3.35 
p = .022 
F(3, 116)= 2.90 
p = .038 
Satisfaction from the 
decision process 
F(3, 116)= 4.07 
p = .009 
F(3, 116) = 2.22 
p = .089 
F(3, 116) = 2.84 
p = .041 
Difficulty level  F(3, 116) = 2.77 
p = .045 
F(3, 116) = 4.41 
p = .006 
F(3, 116) = .66 
p = .580 
Perception of the 
right number of 
options 
F(3, 116) = 10.21 
p = .000 
F(3, 116)= 2.78 
p = .044 
F(3, 116)= 3.98 
p = .010 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1: Satisfaction as a function of the number of alternatives  
Figure 2:  Dependent variables as a function of the number of alternatives in the choice 
set, Experiments 1 and 2 
Figure 3: Effect of different visual presentation, Experiment 1 
Figure 4: Effect of different visual presentation, Experiment 2 
Figure 5: Effect of “awareness” of alternatives, Experiment 4 vs. 2 
 
 









Figure 1: Satisfaction as a function of the number of alternatives 
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Figure 2B. Satisfaction function from the decision-
making process 
 








Figure 2d. Perception of the “right number” of options 





Figure 2:  Dependent variables as a function of the number of alternatives in the choice 
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Figure 5b. Satisfaction function from the decision-
making process 
 








Figure 5d. Perception of the “right number” of options 
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Appendix A   
 
Increases/ declines of means among choice sets with different numbers of 
alternatives 
 
*** significant at 1 percent level 
** significant at 5 percent level 












Measure  Sample  5 vs 10  5 vs 15  5 vs 30  10 vs 15  10 vs 30  15 vs 30 
Experiment 1  +1.53***  +0.73**  +0.13  -0.80**  -1.40***  -0.60* 
Experiment 2  +0.14  +1.20***  +0.60  +1.06**  +0.46  -0.60 
Satisfaction from 
the gift box 
picked 
Experiment 4  +1.20**  +1.40*  +0.60  +0.20  -0.60  -0.80 
Experiment 1  +1.37***  +1.23***  +0.97**  -0.14  -0.40  -0.26 





Experiment 4  +1.03*  +1.63***  +1.73***  +0.60  +0.73  +0.13 
Experiment 1  +1.27**  +1.27**  +1.47**  0  +0.20  +0.20 
Experiment 2  +1.70**  +0.27  +1.88***  -1.43**  +0.17  +1.6**  Difficulty level 
Experiment 4  +0.10  +0.80  +0.64  +0.70  +0.54  -0.16   43 
Appendix B  
 
Gender effects for four dependent variables 
 
 
Gender dummy  Interaction: options * gender   
Measure  Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
Satisfaction from 
the gift box 
F(1, 115) = 4.07 
p = .046 
F(1, 115) = 7.16 
p = .009 
F(3, 112) = 0.49 
p = .693 
F(3, 112) = 1.55 




F(1, 115) = 2.37 
p = .013 
F(1, 115) = 7.87 
p = .006 
F(3, 112) = 2.27 
p = .084 
F(3, 112) = 0.14 
p = .935 
Difficulty level 
F(1, 115) = 0.08 
p = .775 
F(1, 115) = 0.49 
p = .487 
F(3, 112) = 0.02 
p = .997 
F(3, 112) = 0.37 
p = .774 
Perception of the 
right number of 
options 
F(1, 115) = 0.17 
p = .683 
F(1, 115) = 1.08 
p = .302 
F(3, 112) = 2.01 
p = .117 
F(3, 112) = 1.26 
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Appendix C   
 
Complexity effects for four dependent variables 
 
Complexity dummy  Interaction: options*complexity 
 
Measure 
Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
Satisfaction from 
the gift box  F(1, 115) = 9.81 
p = .002 
F(1, 115) = 5.72 
p = .018 
F(3, 112) = 1.14 
p = .337 
F(3, 112) = 2.72 




F(1, 115) = 3.34 
p = .070 
F(1, 115) = 0.07 
p = .791 
F(3, 112) = 0.18 
p = .908 
F(3, 112) = 0.26 
p = .853 
Difficulty level 
F(1, 115) = 1.23 
p = 0.270 
F(1, 115) = 0.02 
p = 0.878 
F(3, 112) = 0.09 
p = .966 
F(3, 112) = 1.29 
p = .282 
Perception of the 
right number of 
options 
F(1, 115) = 0.79 
p = .377 
F(1, 115) = 1.03 
p = .312 
F(3, 112) = 0.17 
p = .915 
F(3, 112) = 1.37 
p = .256 
 
 